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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
September 25, 1962

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REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE

Press Conference
September 13, 1962

Following is the transcript of President Kennedy's news conference yesterday:

THE PRESIDENT: I have a preliminary statement.

There has been a great deal of talk on the situation in Cuba in recent days both in the Communist camp and in our own, and I would like to take this opportunity to set the matter in perspective.

In the first place, it is Mr. Castro and his supporters who are in trouble. In the last year, his regime has been increasingly isolated from this Hemisphere. His name no longer inspires the same fear or following in other Latin American countries. He has been condemned by the OAS, excluded from the Inter-American Defense Board, and kept out of the (Latin American) Free Trade Association. By his own monumental economic mismanagement, supplemented by our refusal to trade with him, his economy has crumbled, and his pledges for economic progress have been discarded, along with his pledges for political freedom. His industries are stagnating, his harvests are declining, his own followers are beginning to see that their revolution has been betrayed.

So it is not surprising that in a frantic effort to bolster his regime he should try to arouse the Cuban people by charges of an imminent American invasion, and commit himself still further to a Soviet take-over in the hope of preventing his own collapse.

Ever since communism moved into Cuba in 1958, Soviet technical and military personnel have moved steadily onto the island in increasing numbers at the invitation of the Cuban government.

Now that movement has been increased. It is under our most careful surveillance. But I will repeat the conclusion that I reported last week, that these new shipments do not constitute a serious threat to any other part of this hemisphere.

If the United States ever should find it necessary to take military action against communism in Cuba, all of Castro's Communist-supplied weapons and technicians would not change the result or significantly extend the time required to achieve that result.

However, unilateral military intervention on the part of the United States cannot currently be either required or justified, and it is regrettable that loose talk about such action in this country might serve to give a thin color of legitimacy to the Communist pretense that such a threat exists. But let me make this clear once again: If at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way, including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the Panama Canal, our missile and space activities at Cape Canaveral, or the lives of American citizens in this country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force against any nation in this hemisphere, or become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.

We shall be alert, too, and fully capable of dealing swiftly with any such development. As President and Commander-in-Chief I have

full authority now to take such action, and I have asked the Congress to authorize me to call up reserve forces should this or any other crisis make it necessary.

In the meantime, we intend to do everything within our power to prevent such a threat from coming into existence. Our friends in Latin America must realize the consequences such developments hold out for their own peace and freedom, and we shall be making further proposals to them. Our friends in NATO must realize the implications of their ships engaging in the Cuban trade.

We shall continue to work with Cuban refugee leaders who are dedicated as we are to that nation's future return to freedom. We shall continue to keep the American people and the Congress fully informed. We shall increase our surveillance of the whole Caribbean area. We shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.

With this in mind, while I recognize that rash talk is cheap, particularly on the part of those who do not have the responsibility, I would hope that the future record will show that the only people talking about a war or an invasion at this time are the Communist spokesmen in Moscow and Havana, and that the American people defending as we do so much of the free world, will in this nuclear age, as they have in the past, keep both their nerve and their head.

Offensive Action

Q: Mr. President, coupling this statement with the one of last week, at what point do you determine that the buildup in Cuba has lost its

defensive character and become offensive? Would it take an overt act?

A: I think if you read last week's statement and the statement today, I made it quite clear, particularly in last week's statement, when we talked about the presence of offensive military missile capacity or development of military base and other indications which I gave last week, all those would, of course, indicate a change in the nature of the threat.

Monroe Doctrine

Q: Well, Mr. President, in this same line, have you set for yourself any rule or set of conditions at which you will determine that the existence of an offensive rather than a defensive force in Cuba, and in that same connection in your reading of the Monroe Doctrine, how do you define intervention? Will it require force to contravene the Monroe Doctrine or does the presence of a foreign power in any force, but not using that force in this hemisphere, amount to contravention of the Doctrine?

A: Well, I have indicated that if Cuba should possess a capacity to carry out offensive action against the United States, that the United States would act. I have also indicated that the United States would not permit Cuba to export its power by force to the hemisphere. The United States will make appropriate military judgments after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other after carefully analyzing whatever new information comes in, as to whether the point has been reached where an offensive threat does exist. And at that time the country and the Congress will be so notified.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S STATEMENT ON SOVIET MILITARY SHIPMENTS TO CUBA

Press Conference
September 4, 1962

"All Americans as well as all of our friends in this hemisphere have been concerned over the recent moves of the Soviet Union to bolster the military power of the Castro regime in Cuba.

"Information has reached this Government in the last four days from a variety of sources which established without doubt that the Soviets have provided the Cuban Government with a number of anti-aircraft defensive missiles with a slant range of twenty-five miles which are similar to early models of our Nike.

"Along with these missiles the Soviets are apparently providing the extensive radar and other electronic equipment which is required for their operation.

"We can also confirm the presence of several Soviet-made motor torpedo boats carrying ship-to-ship guided missiles having a range of fifteen miles.

"The number of Soviet military technicians now known to be in Cuba or enroute -- approximately 3,500 -- is consistent with assistance in setting up and learning to use this equipment.

"As I stated last week we shall continue to make information available as fast as it is obtained and properly verified.

"There is no evidence of any organized combat force in Cuba from any Soviet bloc country; of military bases provided to Russia; of a violation of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantanamo; of the presence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles; or of other significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance.

"Were it to be otherwise the gravest issues would arise. The Cuban question must be considered as a part of the world-wide challenge posed by Communist threats to the peace. It must be dealt with as a part of that larger issues as well as in the context of the special relationships which have long characterized the inter-American system.

"It continues to be the policy of the United States that the Castro regime will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever means may be necessary from taking action against any part of the Western Hemisphere.

"The United States in conjunction with other Hemisphere countries will make sure that, while increased Cuban armaments will be a heavy burden to the unhappy people of Cuba, themselves, they will be nothing more."

Department of State
September 5, 1962

EXCERPT FROM TESTIMONY BY SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK BEFORE
THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS AND ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES,

September 17, 1962

"Now, on the question of how we proceed with various measures and the question of taking action unilaterally, by the United States, no nation, certainly no great nation, can ever abandon its elementary right of unilateral action, if that becomes necessary for its own security.

"That is something which has been recognized in the U.N. Charter, it is something which is implicit in the sovereignty of the Nation itself, and it is a most central and elementary obligation of government in any nation.

"But I do believe, sir, that as a matter of procedure, we can say something more than that about this business.

"We do have strong commitments to try to proceed on a multilateral basis where the security of the hemisphere is involved if we possibly can.

"I think we know from the attitude of many of the American States that if circumstances arose which would make it necessary for us to act directly against Cuba, that those circumstances themselves would impel a great many of the Latin American States to support us in that action. (Deleted from the Committee report)

"Similarly, with respect to our obligations in other parts of the world. In a certain sense it is not possible any longer for the United States to act strictly in unilateral terms. We have 42 allies, we are engaged nose to nose with the Soviet Union right around the globe. It is almost inconceivable that that engagement could become hot at one point and not become hot at others, and at each of these points we are necessarily involved with our allies.

"Therefore, if we think that we can act unilaterally we have to recognize that although we may take the action on our own decision, we necessarily involve a good many others in the action, and I do not believe, Mr. Chairman, that the circumstances which would justify to the leadership of the Congress and to the President and to the American people, a direct military action against Cuba would be such as to find us alone either in this hemisphere or in other parts of the world.

"So, I think the question of unilateral action is, if I may say so, somewhat more theoretical than practical, because we will have, I am quite certain, others prepared to be with us when the circumstances are clear that we have to move in our own defense and the defense of this hemisphere."

SPECIFIC STEPS TAKEN TO ISOLATE AND WEAKEN THE CASTRO REGIME

United States Action Against Cuba

The specific U.S. objective is to isolate and weaken the present Cuban regime with a view to its replacement by a government which shares the principles and institutions of this hemisphere. During the past two years, the United States has taken a number of steps which contribute to this objective.

The Cuban regime finds itself today increasingly cut off from the company of free men, its economy crumbling, its people restive, and its pledges for freedom and plenty long discarded.

I. Economic Measures

Total United States-Cuban trade in 1958 totaled more than \$1 billion dollars. Total United States-Cuban trade in 1962 is expected to be less than \$1 million -- almost all in exports of United States foods and medical supplies to Cuba, sanctioned for humanitarian reasons.

This reduction of trade to less than one-thousandth of its former value was taken by a series of measures after the United States established that the Cuban government had destroyed both the Cuban people and its own promises for social and economic justice and that this country was faced with a hostile regime which was aligned with the Sino-Soviet bloc.

This first step was taken in July 1960, when the United States prohibited the further importation of Cuban sugar into the United States. In October 1960, this Government prohibited the further export of United States goods to Cuba. An exception on humanitarian grounds was made for the export of certain foods and medicines. The Cuban regime had earlier begun to shift its foreign trade to the Sino Soviet bloc. The prohibition on exports deprived the regime of the manufactured items and spare parts necessary to maintain its "made in the USA" industry.

In February 1962, the President proclaimed an embargo on U.S. trade with Cuba. The export of certain foods and medical supplies was again excepted. The embargo reduced to a trickle the trade which had previously bound the two countries. For example, in May U.S. exports totaled \$35,000.

April

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

The President acted under the authority of Section 620 (a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. He acted in accordance with the decisions of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics who met at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in January 1962, to discuss the Cuban problem. This Government imposed the embargo to deprive the Cuban regime of the dollars which it had been earning from its sale of products in this country.

Subsequent amendments to the embargo were taken in March and May. They prohibited the importation of goods containing Cuban products into the United States from any country. The prohibition extended even to the bringing of these products into the United States by American tourists returning from abroad. A number of supplementary measures have also been taken.

Aid Bill Restrictions

Section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 provides that no assistance under the Act shall be given to any country which "furnishes assistance to the present government of Cuba unless the President determines that such assistance is in the national interest of the United States." Section 620(a) is substantially the same as Section 110 of the Mutual Security Appropriations Act of 1961 and Section 109 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Act, 1962. The United States has transmitted this information to appropriate foreign governments.

Bunkering in U.S. Ports

Since May of 1962 this Government has denied bunkers in U.S. ports to all vessels under charter to the Sino-Soviet bloc for the carriage of cargoes between Cuba and the Sino-Soviet bloc. Prior to that time the U.S. had, as part of its policy of full economic measures against Communist China, denied bunkering facilities to all vessels under Communist Chinese charter including those engaged in trade with Cuba. On August 9, 1962 Commerce regulations were amended to prevent Cuban owned or chartered vessels from obtaining bunkers and all ships stores. Bunker products include fuels and lubricants; ships stores include all other provisions and operating supplies.

Amendment of Transportation Order T-1

The Department of Commerce transportation Order T-1 was amended September 1962, to prohibit vessels and aircraft registered in the U.S. from transporting to Cuba commodities on the U.S. Positive List, the U.S. Munitions List or controlled by the Atomic Energy Commission. This amendment will also affect about 360 foreign flag vessels whose owners have contractually agreed not to violate the transportation order.

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II. POLITICAL MEASURES

The United States has long recognized the threat which the present Cuban regime poses to the peace and security of the hemisphere. Its concern had not always been shared in the past by the other members of the Organization of American States.

The declaration by Fidel Castro in December, 1961, that he was a Communist broke the spell that he had cast over many sectors of Latin Americans. The other American Republics began to realize that the Cuban regime was a tool of the Sino-Soviet bloc in a conspiracy to subvert the free governments of Latin America.

The Punte del Este Meeting

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The Foreign Ministers of the OAS met together in Punta del Este during ~~May~~ ^{June} 1962, and made a number of decisions which resulted in the isolation of the Cuban regime from the inter-American system. They clearly identified the danger of Castro/Communism to the hemisphere. They declared that the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba was incompatible with the principles and objectives of the inter-American system, and they excluded the Cuban regime from the system. They suspended trade with Cuba in arms and implements of war and charged the Council of the OAS to study further trade restrictions. They excluded the Cuban regime from the Inter-American Defense Board, and urged member states to take steps to individually and collectively defend themselves against subversion.

The Special Consultative Committee on Security

The Council of the OAS subsequently established a Special Consultative Committee on Security as a body of experts to advise member government on how to fight communism. The Committee submitted an Initial General Report in May describing the Communist objectives and methods of operation in this hemisphere and recommending measures to counter their subversive activities.

The Committee now has before it specific proposals to deal with communist aggression.

The Special Committee on Trade

The Council of the OAS has also established a special Committee to study the future suspension of hemispheric trade with Cuba. The Committee is expected to take up proposals restricting hemispheric trade with Cuba.

III. The Meeting of Latin American Foreign Ministers

The Secretary of State will meet informally in early October with Latin American Foreign Ministers who are attending the General Assembly of the United Nations. Cuba will undoubtedly be among the subjects discussed by the Foreign Ministers, and the possible course of the hemispheric response to the increased Soviet involvement in Cuba may be charted at the informal meeting.

IV. The Alliance for Progress

Justifiable concern about Cuba should not divert Americans from this country's task of attacking the sources of the communist appeal in Latin America--poverty, hunger and ignorance. The US, and the other American Republics have launched the Alliance for Progress as a monumental undertaking which will virtually remake the face of Latin America. This Government hopes through self-help and mutual cooperation to bring social and economic reform to the peoples of the hemisphere and to increase their standards of living. By succeeding, we will destroy the very basis for communist exploitation.

V. Action in Other Areas

The Cuban problem must be considered as part of the world-wide challenge posed by communism. This Government is dealing with Cuba as a part of this larger issue as well as in the context of the special relationships which have long bound together the inter-American system.

The United States reported to the North Atlantic Council in February about the decisions and discussion at Punta del Este. The United States asked the NATO countries to take into account in the formulation of their Cuban policies the actions taken at Punta del Este. This Government has continued to discuss the Cuban problem with NATO. It has also undertaken bilateral talks with our major allies on the many aspects of the Cuban problem.

Multilateral and bilateral talks with our allies will continue. The United States has indications that our concern about the Cuban threat is increasingly shared by these other countries and that they will unite with the United States to counter the Cuban threat.

September 25, 1962

REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SITUATION INSIDE CUBA

Economic: A Picture of Dislocation and Decline.

Three and one-half years of revolutionary upheaval, gross mismanagement, and the economic maladjustment resulting from the re-orientation of its trade from the West to the Sino-Soviet bloc have resulted in a general economic decline.

Since the end of 1960 living standards in Cuba have been declining steadily. Although the total volume of workers' salaries has increased substantially and rents have been reduced, the volume of goods available for purchase by the population has been shrinking.

Food shortages are acute. The rationing of food staples and certain household items was begun in March 1962 and the regime has proved deficient in meeting food minimums. Per capita food consumption is estimated to have declined by more than 15 percent. Cuba has dropped from third to seventh place among the twenty Latin American Republics in per capita food consumption and the present Cuban intake has fallen below the minimum requirement standard for Latin America.

Cuban agriculture is in trouble. Cuban leaders have repeatedly admitted to failures in production. The result has been a series of policy and organizational changes. Complete socialization of agriculture remains the stated goal of the regime and controls over the collectivized agricultural sector have been tightened.

The Cuban economy was and still is keyed to sugar. Sugar accounts for 80 percent of export earnings and 25 percent of the gross national product. The 1962 Cuban sugar crop yielded only 4.8 million metric tons and 17 percent under the average of the crops during the past five years and 30 per cent below the 1961 bumper crop of 6.8 million tons.

Cuba's industrial establishment has undergone a gradual but general deterioration. Rates of decline vary considerably from one industry to another. Production of consumer goods has fallen both in volume and quality. The flight of qualified Cuban technicians and the irregularity in the supply of raw materials from the Bloc have contributed to the industrial deterioration.

Although material assistance from the Bloc may shield the Castro regime from the worst consequences of its own economic mismanagement, such aid is not likely to offset completely the downward trend in Cuba's economy.

Political: Struggle for Support and Power

Domestic support for the Cuban régime is declining, disaffection is increasing, in large measure because of the inability of the regime to provide the goods and services, including public health and medical services, to which most of the Cuban people have been accustomed. Domestic propaganda has lost a good deal of its hold over the Cuban people and they are growing bored with the repetitive communist indoctrination.

A struggle for power exists between the "new communists" represented by the Castro forces and the "old-line" communists placed by Moscow. An uneasy peace rests upon the need of each group for the other. We cannot expect, however, that the "old-liners" will accept eclipse. The arrival of many Soviet technicians in Cuba, and their attempt to run internal Cuban affairs, inevitably will create strain between Cuba and the Soviet Union.

SOVIET MILITARY AID TO CUBA

The recent Soviet shipments to Cuba of arms and technicians indicate a significant increase in the Soviet involvement in Cuba. The Soviet Union has provided Cuba with anti-aircraft defensive missiles with a range of 25 miles, similar to early models of our Nike; extensive radar and other electronic equipment required for the operation of these missiles; Soviet-made motor torpedo boats carrying ship-to-ship guided missiles with a range of 15 miles; surface-to-ship cruise missile sites; MIG-21 aircraft; and approximately 4,000 Soviet military technicians, already in Cuba or en route, consistent with assistance in setting up and learning to use this equipment. This aid will increase the defense capacity of the Cuban regime and the effectiveness of Cuban military forces for possible internal use.

This is all the information which has been obtained and properly verified up to the present. More information will be made available to the American people as fast as it becomes known.

Sino-Soviet bloc military aid to Cuba started in the autumn of 1960, and as of the beginning of 1962 aid in the form of equipment and technical services amounted to about \$100 million. This aid had by then already turned the Cuban military establishment into one of the most formidable in Latin America. The ground forces numbered about 300,000, and Cuba possessed MIG jet fighters, medium and heavy tanks, field and anti-aircraft artillery, patrol vessels and motor torpedo boats, and about 200,000 small arms.

There is no evidence, however, of any organized combat force in Cuba from any Soviet bloc country; of military bases provided to Russia; of a violation of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantanamo; of the presence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles; or of other significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance. Nor is there evidence that the build-up endangers or interferes with our passage to the Panama Canal; our missile and space activities in Cape Canaveral; the lives of American citizens in this country, or our security in any other way.

September 25, 1962

THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

The Latin American Republics, except Cuba, the United States and the Alliance for Progress have launched a joint effort to eliminate the social and economic sources of chronic poverty, disease and hunger in this hemisphere through land and tax reform, technical assistance and public and private investment in the economies of the Latin American Republics. This ten-year program of self-help and mutual cooperation among the American Republics is aimed at overcoming the serious domestic political problems of these countries, which stem in part from the inroads of communists and other extremist elements. The improvement of the political, economic and social climate in these countries should make possible orderly progress benefiting the whole hemisphere within a democratic framework.

The Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, held at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in January 1962, recognized that the communist offensive in the Americas poses a danger to the democratic institutions of the hemisphere. The Meeting took several steps to deal with this danger, including the exclusion of the present Government of Cuba from participation in the inter-American system. Another of its decisions called upon the Council of the Organization of American States to maintain vigilance regarding acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to the peace and security resulting from the intervention of Sino-Soviet powers in the hemisphere. In addition the Foreign Ministers provided for the establishment of the Special Consultative Committee on Security to assist governments in security matters. The Committee presented its initial general report on May 1. The embargo imposed by the United States on Cuban imports pursuant to the decisions of the Foreign Ministers has resulted in a loss of income to Cuba and hence in Cuba's capacity to engage in subversive activities in the hemisphere.

At the time of the Punta del Este Meeting, twelve of the American Republics had broken relations with Cuba. Since then two more, Argentina and Ecuador, have suspended relations. Only five Latin American countries still have relations with Cuba.

We have been in regular consultation with the other governments of this hemisphere concerning Cuba. On October 2 and 3, Secretary of State Rusk will meet informally in Washington with the foreign ministers of the other American Republics to discuss the situation in Cuba and to consider possible further steps.

September 25, 1962

A CUBAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE

The Department has received various inquiries concerning the possibility of recognition of a Cuban Government in Exile in order to demonstrate that the Castro regime is not representative of the Cuban people. Following is a statement taken from a recent letter from the State Department outlining some of the problems involved in such a move:

"The recognition of a Cuban government-in-exile at this time is not in the national interest of the United States because neither the Government of Switzerland or any other government could then represent United States interests before the Castro regime. Were a government-in-exile formed, and should the United States recognize such a government, the United States would have to look to that government and not to the present government in Cuba for the fulfillment of Cuban obligations. There are in addition a number of United States citizens who still reside in Cuba. The Swiss are trying to assist them, including some who are in prison and who can only be reached through the efforts of the Swiss Embassy in Havana."

Other problems arise in attempting to choose among the 200 different Cuban refugee organizations and designate one as the legitimate representative of the non-communist Cuban people.

September 25, 1962

WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

There is no evidence that any arms or strategic materials are being carried to Cuba in vessels of Western European countries. Furthermore, there has been no increase in Western European shipping to Cuba in recent months.

We have made strong approaches to the countries of Western Europe requesting them to reexamine their trade policies and the extent of their commerce with Cuba, for the purpose of bringing their policies toward Cuba more closely in line with those of the U.S. We feel encouraged by the increasing seriousness with which these countries view the Cuban problem.

On the particular problem of ships of Western European countries trading with Cuba, we have recently received a number of positive indications that a number of European countries are taking steps to persuade their shippers to reduce the chartering of their ships in the Cuban trade.

September 25, 1962

HISTORY OF MONROE DOCTRINE

Extracts from President Monroe's Seventh Annual Message To Congress
December 2, 1823

..."In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers...

..."We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by an European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between those new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security."

The Monroe Doctrine was reasserted by President Polk in his first annual message to Congress December 2, 1845.

..."The United States, sincerely desirous of preserving relations of good understanding with all nations, can not in silence permit any European interference on the North American continent, and should any such interference be attempted will be ready to resist it at any and all hazards.

It is well known to the American people and to all nations that this Government has never interfered with the relations subsisting between other governments. We have never made ourselves parties to their wars or their alliances; we have not sought their territories

by conquest; we have not mingled with parties in their domestic struggles; and believing our own form of government to be the best, we have never attempted to propagate it by intrigues, by diplomacy, or by force. We may claim on this continent a like exemption from European interference..."

The French Intervention in Mexico during the period of the Civil War caused great concern in the United States, as reflected in the House Resolution of April 4, 1864.

"Resolved. That the Congress of the United States are unwilling, by silence, to leave the nations of the world under the impression that they are indifferent spectators of the deplorable events now transpiring in the Republic of Mexico; and they therefore think fit to declare that it does not accord with the policy of the United States to acknowledge a monarchical government, erected on the ruins of any republics government in America, under the auspices of any European power."

Secretary Seward commented on proposed Austrian Intervention:

..."You inform me that it is expected that about one thousand volunteers will be shipped (under this treaty) from Trieste to Vera Cruz very soon, and that at least as many more will be shipped in autumn.

I have heretofore given you the President's instructions to ask for explanations, and, conditionally, to inform the government of Austria that the despatch of military expeditions by Austria under such an arrangement as the one which seems now to have been consummated would be regarded with serious concern by the United States...."

The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, now completely discarded, proposed a principle that since the U.S. permits no European nation to intervene in Latin American affairs, we must then assume the responsibility of preserving order and protecting life and property in those countries.

Annual Message from President Theodore Roosevelt to the United States Congress, December 5, 1905.

"There are certain essential points which must never be forgotten as regards the Monroe Doctrine. In the first place we must as a nation make it evident that we do not intend to treat it in any shape or way as an excuse for aggrandizement on our part at the expense of

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the republics to the south. We must recognize the fact that in some South American countries there has been much suspicion lest we should interpret the Monroe Doctrine as in some way inimical to their interests, and we must try to convince all the other nations of this continent once and for all that no just and orderly government has anything to fear from us.

"There are of course limits to the wrongs which any self-respecting nation can endure. It is always possible that wrong actions toward this Nation, or toward citizens of this Nation, in some State unable to keep order among its own people, unable to secure justice from outsiders, and unwilling to do justice to those outsiders who treat it well, may result in our having to take action to protect our rights; but such action will not be taken with a view to territorial aggression, and it will be taken at all only with extreme reluctance and when it has become evident that every other resource has been exhausted."

President Wilson rejected the Roosevelt theory but reasserted the viability of the Monroe Doctrine in a memorandum from the Counselor for the Department of State (Robert Lansing):

"There is another method by which such power may be acquired, a method, which today can be more easily and more successfully employed than those to which the Monroe Doctrine has been in the past applied. It is a mode of extending political power, which, in my opinion, has caused much of the confusion and uncertainty as to the scope of the Monroe Doctrine because of its gradual development and the failure to recognize it as in practical conflict with that policy."

When by reason of commercial and financial domination a European power becomes undoubted master of the political conduct of an American republic, is a condition presented which may justify the United States in applying to it the Monroe Doctrine with the same vigor, with which it would have applied the Doctrine if the European power had by force or treaty established a protectorate over the American republic?"

Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary of State, made some important observations on the Monroe Doctrine on August 30, 1923:

"The Monroe Doctrine is not a legislative pronouncement; it has been approved by action of Congress, but it does not rest upon any congressional sanction. It has had the implied indorsement of the treaty-making power in the reservations to the two Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907, but it is not defined

by treaty and does not draw its force from any international agreement. It is not like a constitutional provision deriving its authority from the fact that it is a part of the organic law transcending and limiting executive and legislative power. It is not a part of international law, maintained by the consent of the civilized powers and alterable only at their will. It is a policy declared by the Executive of the United States and repeated in one form and another by Presidents and Secretaries of State in the conduct of our foreign relations. Its significance lies in the fact that in its essentials, as set forth by President Monroe and as forcibly and repeatedly asserted by our responsible statesmen, it has been for 100 years, and continues to be, an integral part of our national thought and purpose, expressing a profound conviction which even the upheaval caused by the Great War, and our participation in that struggle upon European soil, has not uprooted or fundamentally changed."

"First, the Monroe Doctrine is not a policy of self-defense."

"Second, as the policy embodied in the Monroe Doctrine is distinctively the policy of the United States, the government of the United States reserves to itself its definition, interpretation, and application."

"Further, in its own declarations the United States has never bound itself to any particular course of conduct in case of action by other powers contrary to the principles announced."

"Third, the policy of the Monroe Doctrine does not infringe upon the independence and sovereignty of other American States."

"The Monroe Doctrine does not attempt to establish a protectorate over Latin American States. Certainly, the declaration that intervention by non-American powers encroaching upon the independence of American States will be regarded as dangerous to our own safety, gives no justification for such intervention on our part."

"Fourth, there are, indeed, modern conditions and recent events which can not fail to engage our attention. We have grown rich and powerful, but we have not outgrown the necessity, in justice to ourselves and without injustice to others, of safeguarding our future peace and security."

"Fifth, it is apparent that the Monroe Doctrine does not stand in the way of Pan American co-operation in the independence and security of American States."

"Finally

"Finally, it should be observed that the Monroe Doctrine is not an obstacle to a wider international co-operation, beyond the limits of Pan American aims and interests, whenever the co-operation is congenial to American institutions. From the foundation of the government we have sought to promote the peaceful settlement of international controversies."

The Department of State pointed out another important consideration under the Monroe Doctrine when Frank B. Kellogg was Secretary of State, December 17, 1928:

"Should it become necessary to apply a sanction for a violation of the Doctrine as declared by Monroe, that sanction would run against the European power offending the policy, and not against the Latin American country which was the object of the European aggression, unless a conspiracy existed between the European and the American states involved."

"It is evident that the Monroe Doctrine is not an equivalent for "self-preservation"; and therefore the Monroe Doctrine need not, indeed should not, be invoked in order to cover situations challenging our self-preservation but not within the terms defined by Monroe's declaration. These other situations may be handled, and more wisely so, as matters affecting the national security and self-preservation of the United States as a great power."

President Franklin D. Roosevelt completely changed the conception of U.S.-Latin American relations with his Good Neighbor Policy first expressed in his Inaugural Address, March 4, 1933:

"...In the field of world policy, I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor--the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others--the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors. We now realize as we have never realized before our interdependence on each other; that we cannot merely take, but must give as well..."

President Roosevelt also pointed out the emerging roll of the Western Hemisphere in world affairs which changed the original Monroe Doctrine theory that Europe should not become involved in the Western Hemisphere because the United States would not become involved in Europe.

"The American family of nations may also rightfully claim,

now, to speak to the rest of the world. We have an interest, wider than that of the mere defense of our sea-ringed continent. We know now that the development of the next generation will so narrow the oceans separating us from the Old World, that our customs and our actions are necessarily involved with hers."

The Monroe Doctrine merged itself into a thoroughly multilateral action by the American Republics as a result of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947:

Article 3, Paragraph 1

"The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations."

Article 6

"If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental conflict, or intra-continental conflict, or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent."

Article 8

"For the purposes of this Treaty, the measures on which the Organ of Consultation may agree will comprise one or more of the following: recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic relations; breaking of consular relations; partial or complete interruption of economic relations or of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and radio-telephonic or radio-telegraphic communications; and use of armed force."

The Charter of the Organization of American States resulted in final U.S. renunciation of the Theodore Roosevelt intervention theory. The U S. bound itself to the following:

Article 17

"The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized."

Article 18

"The American States bind themselves in their international relations not to have recourse to the use of force, except in the case of self-defense in accordance with existing treaties or in fulfillment thereof."

The extension of the Monroe Doctrine to the communist threat was enunciated in an address by Edward G. Miller, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, April 26, 1950.

"In his proclamation of what later came to be known as the Monroe Doctrine, President Monroe declared that the political system of the powers in the Old World was essentially different from that of America, and "that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this Hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety." We are no longer concerned today with the political system of the Holy Alliance, based on monarchy and the exploitation of peoples kept in colonial servitude. We are concerned, however, with the alien political system of Communist Russia, based as it is on totalitarian dictatorship and the enslavement of populations at home and abroad. The Monroe Doctrine, has not lost its meaning with the passage of a century and a quarter, for, today, we consider any attempt to extend the Communist system to any portions of this hemisphere as "dangerous to our peace and safety." This attitude is still basic to our policy."

The Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, on April 14, 1958, explored the multilateral aspects of the Inter-American system:

"That (the Monroe Doctrine) was the first great proclamation of interdependence. It was, at its inception, a unilateral

proclamation